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Abstract 
 
Despite its rich and deepening panoply of empirical support, 
evolutionary theory continues to generate widespread concern.  
Some of this concern can be attributed to misunderstandings of the 
original concept, some to unfamiliarity with its current trajectories, and 
some to strongly held fears that it strips the human of cherished 
attributes.  This essay seeks to deconstruct such misunderstandings, 
lift up current concepts of what evolution entails, and address some 
of the existential issues it generates. 
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A philosopher friend recently asked me the following questions:  
 
1)  What is your understanding of evolution and its religious 
relevance? 
 
2)  Might you address the deep question as to whether the worldview 
implied by most standard science is mechanistic?  Is it possible to 
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show that Neo-Darwinism does not affirm the mechanistic world view, 
that it provides for the causal efficacy of free and purposive action?  
Or, how you do see the worldview assumed and affirmed by 
mainstream science?   
 
3)  Can Neo-Darwinism itself be reformulated so as to make much 
clearer than is normally done that it has room for more dimensions of 
the total life process? 
 
 These questions have stimulated the remarks I offer below.  I 
offer them in the context of a paper that Terry Deacon and I recently 
published in Zygon (1) wherein we consider various aspects of the 
evolutionary process, and human evolution in particular, from the 
perspective of emergence, with a focus on the moral facet of religious 
response.  It is my hope that these two essays will illustrate that 
present-day “mainstream” evolutionary concepts are exciting, multi-
dimensional, and have much to offer to the religious life.  I also 
grapple, in this essay, with the question of why these concepts are so 
often misunderstood and so often the target of vilification.  
 
Neo-Darwinism 
 
 I realized in starting out that I didn’t know what Neo-Darwinism 
is.  So I entered it in www.google.com.  The #1 hit was to a site 
criticizing Neo-Darwinism and favoring the panspermia theory 
wherein life comes in from other planets.  The next 3 hits were 
critiques offered by creationist/intelligent design organizations.  As I 
continued to read, I came to understand that the term Neo-Darwinism 
serves as code for views of the evolutionary process that a variety of 
persons and groups are not comfortable with.  
 
 The original term, neo-Darwinian theory, was not an -ism.  
Rather, it referred to the coupling of two understandings:  1) the 19th-
century Darwinian understanding that selection acting on heritable 
variation would produce evolutionary change and 2) the early 20th-
century understanding that heritable variants arise by the apparently 
random process of gene mutation.  While features of this synthesis 
have been summarized in various short phrases, the original version 
of the theory, in Julian Huxley’s Evolution:  the Modern Synthesis  
(1942), was book-length, and multiple additional layers of 
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understanding of the relationship between genetics and evolution 
have been accumulating in the ensuing 60 years. 
 
 Particularly interesting is that whereas there appears to be 
broad appreciation that atomic theory, for example, has deepened 
profoundly since its original articulation, bringing us quarks and 
strong and weak nuclear forces and the like, neo-Darwinian theory is 
described by Neo-Darwinism detractors in much the form that it was 
originally set forth.  The additional layers of understanding -- the 
evolutionary role of gene duplications and of mutations in genetic 
regulatory elements, for example – are hard to find in web-site 
treatises on Neo-Darwinism.                    
 
 So why is it the case that atomic theory has not become 
“Atomism” and its “Atomist” adherents the target of critical websites, 
whereas neo-Darwinian theory has become the nefarious Neo-
Darwinism practiced by reductionistic materialistic know-it-all Neo-
Darwinists?  Why are there no proposals that “overturn” Atomism 
while proposals abound that “expose the fatal flaws” of a 60-year-old 
version of evolutionary theory called Neo-Darwinism?  The answer, I 
can only presume, is that atomic theory does not seem to generate 
existential concerns while neo-Darwinian theory clearly does. 
 
 I will take up the matter of existential concern below.  But at this 
juncture, given that the term Neo-Darwinism has come to carry such 
baggage, I suggest that it be jettisoned and that we just talk about 
present-day theories of biological evolution.   
 
With that said, we can go on to examine the pejoratives 
“reductionistic” and “materialistic,” which will lead us into our 
philosopher’s question about “mechanistic.” 
 
Reductionism and Holism 
 
 I am a bench scientist, a molecular geneticist/cell biologist, and 
have devoted my career to the study of a eukaryotic single-celled 
green alga called Chlamydomonas.  My colleagues and I have made 
contributions to an understanding of how the organism carries out 
photosynthesis, how it swims, how it forms its cell wall, how it 
conducts its sexual cycle, and how the genes that encode various 
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sexual traits have diverged when two closely related Chlamydomonas 
species are compared.   
 
Our experiments are “reductionistic” in the sense that they 
focus on genes and proteins and not the whole organism or its 
ecological context.  From a physicist’s perspective, of course, our 
experiments are not reductionist at all since we pay no attention to 
individual atoms or quarks, albeit we are fully aware that these levels 
of organization are “down there” and have everything to do with what 
we attend to; indeed, their existence is fully implicit in our 
experimental design and interpretation.  By the same token, we are 
fully aware that the molecular facets of Chlamydomonas that we are 
studying have everything to do with the whole organism and its 
ecological context, and should we obtain an experimental result that 
is inconsistent with these “larger” understandings – e.g. if our data 
indicate that a protein operates in a certain way after boiling and we 
know that Chlamydomonas is killed by boiling -- we would conclude 
that this property of the protein, albeit of possible interest for some 
reason, is irrelevant to the organism as a whole.  Again, by the same 
token, scientists studying the ecology of Chlamydomonas try to keep 
what is known about its genes and proteins fully in view as they ask 
their “larger” questions, just as they also understand that the 
Chlamydomonas ecosystem is but a tiny part of an enormous 
biosphere which is but a miniscule part of an enormous universe.  
That is, the ecologists are also reductionists. 
 
So who are the “holists”?  I would respond that no scientist, and 
no scholar in any field for that matter, is a holist when asking a 
specific question, since specificity is by definition focused on some 
facet of the whole.  But I would also respond that all scientists are 
holists in that we are all aware, when making a specificity move at 
whatever “level,” that the specifics reside in wholes, where wholes 
are emergent from parts and hence have different properties from 
individual parts. 
 
Systems Thinking 
 
 A critique that is often leveled at molecular-level biologists is 
that we have ignored the existence of complex systems in our 
reductionistic fervor to analyze genes and proteins, that we eschew 
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the “holistic” concepts articulated in complexity theory and its 
synonyms.    
 
 Without in any way disparaging the important theoretical 
contributions made to our understanding of complex systems by the 
likes of Prigogene and Kauffman, an understanding that organisms 
are made up of complex systems has been a core understanding of 
biology since the inception of the field.  Metabolic pathways, 
embryology, neural networks, animal behavior, and so on can only be 
understood as complex systems, and as a graduate student 40 years 
ago this was the implicit grounding of everything that I was taught.   
 
 But once the modern-day principles of complex systems 
thinking are grasped – once one understands the thermodynamic 
constraints and possibilities, the importance of initial and boundary 
conditions and the interdependence of events –  biologists in recent 
decades have gone ahead and sought to understand a specific 
system by studying its parts:  How does microtubule sliding 
participate in the emergent system called flagellar motility?  How 
does cell migration participate in the formation of a nervous system 
during embryology?  How does sequential expression of homeobox 
genes set out the animal body plan?  In asking such questions we 
have in no way lost sight of the system as a whole; rather, we are 
asking questions of the system that allow us to better understand how 
it acquires its holistic properties. 
 
 As it turns out, the upshot of taking this approach is that 
molecular-level biologists are in fact now in a position to take on 
systems-based research more directly, where genome projects, 
widely reviled for their reductionist focus, have provided many of 
these opportunities.  Genome-based technologies now make it 
possible, for example, to identify all the proteins that participate in 
such complex systems as repair of environmentally-induced DNA 
damage or the responses of a plant to desiccation or the metastatic 
growth of a tumor.  Some of the proteins identified are those that we 
already knew something about from previous studies, others are new 
foci for investigation, and the meta-project is to figure out how they all 
interact, in space and time, to generate the resultant complex traits.   
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Importantly, scientists are flocking to explore these 
opportunities, documenting that it is not so much that we were ever 
uninterested in complex systems as that we didn’t have productive 
ways to study them.  A case in point is Marc Kirschner, for decades at 
the forefront of research in molecular cell biology and molecular 
evolution, who has recently founded and chairs a well-endowed 
Department of Systems Biology at Harvard Medical School.    
 
 With these observations in mind, we can return to biological 
evolution and consider a typical finding (2) from my website 
explorations: 
 
Darwin deliberately stressed the reductionistic, physicalist 
aspects of his theory in order to eliminate any hint of the 
involvement of a designer or a vital force in his explanation of 
the development of living things.  Rather, the rhetoric of 
Darwinism is of a ‘force’ (selection) acting upon essentially 
passive objects considered in isolation (organisms). It is the 
rhetoric of physics. And physics has also profoundly influenced 
molecular biology; genes are described as strings of chemicals 
to which mutations happen. It may be, however, that the 
rhetoric of evolution in the next century will be much more in 
terms of Kauffman’s work on self-organization and the 
development of complexity, of interdependent organisms 
exploring together the possibilities of greater complexity. 
 
There are several misconceptions here to lift up right at the 
start.  1) Darwin, an ardent and accomplished naturalist, would have 
decried a definition of organisms as passive objects acting in 
isolation.  2) While it is true that self-organization, complexity, and 
interdependence can be discussed without reference to genes and 
mutations, selection is a central dynamic in Kauffmanian theory (3). 
3) Most importantly, self-organization and the development of 
complexity in biology are not abstract ethereal processes.  They 
occur in cell-based organisms that are constructed from 
macromolecules, and those strings-of-chemicals-to-which-mutations-
happen are the instructions for generating the macromolecules that 
go on self-organize and interact.  Any informed present-day “rhetoric 
of evolution” will include both the parts and the wholes, both the 
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emergent properties and the genomes that encode them, and I 
cannot but imagine that this will always be the case. 
 
Materialism   
 
 Not only is it the case that self-organization and complex 
systems are not abstract ethereal processes in biology; they are also 
not abstract ethereal processes in general.  Kauffman’s formulations 
are steeped in the material, chock-full of physicality and 
thermodynamics.  Yet they are often described, approvingly, as 
somehow taking us beyond the material. 
 
 Poor matter.  This magical stuff, undergirding everything that 
we know to exist (including the minds that hold our understandings of 
existence), is so very often given such disparaging qualifiers as 
“mere” matter or “just” matter or “only” matter.  Indeed, a central 
problem that I have with some versions of the Gaia hypothesis is that 
there is a way that it asks us to value the non-living participants in the 
biosphere – the rocks and the gases -- by saying that they are alive.   
 
I myself prefer the perspective of religionist Michael Kalton (4): 
 
What the poet Robinson Jeffers has referred to as "the massive 
mysticism of stone" surrounds us, inviting us to discover the 
patterning that lives in geologic time or even cosmic time, these 
being substrate to patterns manifest in the rapid complexity of life 
time. What is it from which we have emerged, and to which we 
return at death? It cannot be less than us, for we are formed of it, 
belong to it, manifest it. 
 
Chance and Selection 
 
 Evolutionary theory is often misunderstood to claim that 
everything somehow happened “randomly.”  I participate in a listserv 
that focuses on exploring the concept of religious naturalism 
(religious orientations derived from our understandings of nature (5)), 
and this sentiment is well stated in the following posting: 
 
My hunch, based on my experience as a member and leader in 
the liberal United Church of Christ, is that people are there on a 
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Sunday morning because they can't accept that the wonders 
opened up by science, astronomy, etc. are all a matter of 
chance. They have rejected traditional views of a God in 
heaven judging HIS sinful creation, but awe without purpose 
and meaning behind it is just as meaningless to them.  
 
They might find much support in the concept of religious 
naturalism were it not that they are looking for truth and values 
beyond chance, and indeed beyond human experience.  
 
I would agree that if one's only understanding of the natural 
world is that it is all just a matter of chance, one might well look 
elsewhere for sources of meaning.  But that's not the core message I 
get from the natural world.  I encounter a natural world that is 
brimming with meaning in and of itself, just by being itself, wherein 
serendipitous creativity (as theologian Gordon Kaufman so 
wonderfully puts it (6)) generates countless emergent properties that 
build on themselves.  These include the lives that we live, lives that 
are like no others given the cultures we have created and the 
sensibilities we transmit through them.  From my perspective, what 
more meaning might one want than the astonishing FACT of it all?  
 
But back to the matter of chance.   
 
“Serendipitous” creativity is of course a word that connotes 
chance, and chance for sure plays a big part in the creativity of the 
universe.  But to say that the wonders of the universe are all a matter 
of chance is a misunderstanding.  Chance on its own wouldn't have 
accomplished much of anything.  Chance offers up the variation - the 
possible atoms, the possible molecules, the possible lifeforms, the 
possible ecosystems.  Chance is the generator of creativity, the grist 
in the mill, that allows new things to happen.   
 
But chance is inexorably coupled with selection, which operates 
on that which is created by chance to generate atoms that hold 
together and molecules that fold into useful shapes and lifeforms that 
are adapted to their environment and ecosystems that sustain their 
participants.   Serendipity means chance with a positive outcome, 
and positive outcomes are the product of selection, in all its countless 
guises, be it selection for stable atomic nuclei or selection for 
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thermodynamically favorable molecular outcomes or selection for 
viable ecosystems, including the cultural ecosystems that humans 
construct and inhabit.  Selection generates that which has carried on. 
 
“Selection,” of course, has its own set of problems in that it’s 
another one of those discomfiting words.  The website quote above 
includes an interesting example of this.  The writer expresses dismay 
that “the rhetoric of Darwinism is of a ‘force’ (selection),” and that this 
thereby “eliminates any hint of the involvement of … a vital force.”   
 
I would respond that if any known force makes the cut as a vital 
force, it is natural selection acting on emergent properties. 
 
Mechanism and Machines 
 
 So we are now positioned to consider our philosopher’s query 
about “mechanistic” worldviews.  To what extent is an organism like a 
machine – i.e. mechanistic -- and to what extent is it not? 
 
 In approaching this question, it is germane to first explore how 
we feel about machines.  Most people, in hearing this question, likely 
harbor the hope that the answer will be that an organism is very 
different from a machine.  This hope arises, I would suggest, because 
most don’t hold machines in very high existential regard. While we 
may admire machines and what they are able to accomplish, they 
are, after all, things, constructed of “mere” matter (activating our 
difficulties with matter), and they are, in the end, automatons, a noun 
that we are concerned might apply to organisms like ourselves.  
Indeed, I hear this concern in our philosopher’s query:  “Is it possible 
to show that Neo-Darwinism does not affirm the mechanistic world 
view, that it provides for the causal efficacy of free and purposive 
action?”  
 
 To develop the machine metaphor, let’s take a familiar machine, 
the stuff underneath the hood of a car.  What’s important about this 
machine, and indeed any machine, is not what’s under the hood but 
rather what it generates, its emergent property, in this case car 
motility (automotiveness).  A machine has purpose and value only to 
the extent that it produces an emergent outcome with purpose and 
value.  
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 Granted that, it follows that the more flexible a machine, the 
more purposes it can serve and hence the greater its value.  A car 
engine that can operate at only one speed is not as valuable as one 
that can operate at many speeds, so much thought is put into 
designing gears and accelerators and drive shafts that can bring 
about this result.  A car engine can’t run without fuel, so much 
thought is put into designing fuel tanks and indicator gauges that 
minimize this occurrence.  Motility that can’t stop is dangerous, so 
much goes into designing effective brakes.  A car that can only 
operate at one ambient temperature is not as adaptive as one that 
can operate at many, hence antifreezes, cooling devices, and so on.   
 
 Importantly, as these valuable systems are designed and 
modified, the engineer, in the end, is constantly monitoring the whole 
car:  Does it still move adaptively?  Add a new fuel injection system, 
say, and many other parts may need to be modified such that this 
innovation is commensurate with the whole point of a car. 
 
 And now to organisms. If we look at a trait like motility, found 
throughout the biological kingdom in numerous manifestations, we 
find ingenious mechanisms – yes, mechanisms – that allow for 
different rates of speed, different means of providing and monitoring 
fuel, different ways to start and stop, and different ways that 
movement continues under an array of environmental conditions.  
There are two critical differences, of course.  1) During biological 
evolution, the new ideas and their modifications and integrations are 
offered up by chance mutations and not by the mind of an engineer, 
so the time scales are vastly different and the innovations are not 
thought-through-in-advance on the basis of culturally transmitted 
knowledge.  2) A biological machine like a muscle is not assembled 
from pre-fabricated parts like a car engine; rather, it is the outcome of 
embryology, with muscles and their innervating nerve cells 
differentiating from precursor cells that differentiated from precursor 
cells that ultimately go back to the fertilized egg, all under the aegis of 
elegant systems of activation and constraint, hormones and cell-cell 
contacts, and differential gene expression.  At the level of 
construction, that is, the two projects have nothing in common:  car 
engines are built top-down, muscles are built bottom-up.    
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 But in the end, the overall product can be said to be the same:  
machines that move.  And importantly, natural selection isn’t looking 
at the parts or the construction modality.  Natural selection doesn’t 
“see” genes or proteins, doesn’t “know” about embryological stages.  
Natural selection evaluates whether a creature can carry on, or not, in 
the context it finds itself to be in.  Natural selection monitors 
adaptivity, monitors fitting in. 
 
  So where does this leave us with “free and purposive action”?  I 
would say there’s little problem with “purposive”:  organisms, like 
machines, are nothing if not purposive.  Watch a “lowly” bacterium or 
amoeba moving up a gradient towards a food source, or a “lowly” 
plant bending towards a light source, and it’s all about purpose.  So 
this leaves us with the matter of “free.” 
 
How Free Is Our Will? 
 
 If a car salesman were to tell you that the car under 
consideration operates freely, with no constraints, you would 
doubtless not buy it.  A car (and an organism) must be 
mechanistically reliable if it has any chance at all of generating its 
purposive emergent properties.  When a carburetor starts to operate 
freely, the car is taken to the shop for a tune-up.  This is not to say 
that the carburetor (and the organism) is without choices, but the 
choices (how much air to mix with the gas, what constitutes a food 
gradient) are under exquisite regulation.    
 
 But I suspect that our philosopher’s question is not about a 
carburetor and probably not about an amoeba either.  And likely not 
even about a spider or a snake.  The heart of the question as I hear it 
is this:  If one buys into the “Neo-Darwinian” claim that humans share 
common ancestors with amoebae and snakes, then does this mean 
that WE are as mechanistic as they are and hence without “free will”? 
 
 Granted that debates on free will fill countless volumes of 
philosophical reflection with little consensus, I nonetheless believe 
that evolutionary perspectives can offer insight on this topic.  I will first 
make some general observations and then explore some of the 
concepts more closely. 
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 Evolution, we have said, continuously offers up innovation.  The 
conspicuous innovation during hominid evolution is the language-
based human brain that, in turn, generates what we call “conscious 
self-awareness” or the “narrative self.”  We consider at length 
elsewhere the remarkable properties of the human mind and 
scenarios for its evolution (1), so I will only make two points here.  
 
1) Whereas it is not known, and may never be known, what 
language was originally “for” (hunting? mating?), it is clearly the 
case that once instantiated, it set up a co-evolutionary dynamic 
of language, mind, and cultural transmission of ideas that has 
obviously been enormously adaptive for our species; indeed, 
this dynamic generates the niche (human culture) that we 
immediately inhabit, contributing to our myopias about the 
other niches we inhabit.   
 
2) The origination and selective advantage of possessing a 
narrative self is similarly obscure, and indeed one speculation 
suggests that the narrative self was at first not under direct 
selection at all but rather arose as a by-product, an unintended 
consequence (a “spandral” in the terminology of Stephen Jay 
Gould) of selection for language and cultural habitation.  
Importantly, once a “spandral” arises and proves to be adaptive, 
it becomes a putative substrate for future rounds of natural 
selection, and I believe that there are few who would disagree 
that the narrative self has been a central player in the 
evolutionary/cultural trajectory of Homo sapiens. 
  
 However narrative selves came into being, and however much 
they are reducible to their underlying, and mechanistic, neural 
substrates, they are quintessentially emergent, and one of their 
emergent properties is a sense of free will, a sense that we have the 
capacity to make free choices.  I would put this sensibility on an equal 
footing with our sense that we see red or smell a flower or love our 
children.  Such psychological experiences come to us – we do not 
somehow force them into being – and I would argue that they have 
the same claim to being “natural,” “real,” and “true” as the neural 
mechanisms that make them possible or, for that matter, as any 
emergent property on offer.   
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 To explore these assertions more closely, let me tell a story that 
may be helpful in thinking about the narrative self and its relationship 
to the rest of our minds. 
 
The stairway in my house goes up 5 wide steps, reaches a platform 
landing, and then goes up another 5 wide steps.  On the wall of the 
landing are shelves that house what we call the museum, a collection of 
shells and bones and feathers found on the beach.  
 
One recent afternoon, home alone, I had added something to the museum 
and took two steps backwards to view the resultant effect.  As it turned 
out, I was already at the edge of the landing, meaning that when I took the 
two steps backwards I was in mid-air above the stairway.  
 
I calculate that what happened next took place within about half a second, 
and entailed two aspects of my mind that I'll call Ursula 1 and Ursula 2.  
 
Ursula 1:  What's going on?  I'm in mid-air.  Oh no, I must have stepped 
off the landing.  Idiot!  [Visual image of the stairs below, including the 
severe right angles of the wooden step-edges and the wooden floor at the 
bottom]  Jeese, if I fall backwards on those stairs I'm going to cream 
myself.  [Visual image of Gray's Anatomy diagram of the human spine and 
the effects of the edges slamming into vertebrae of arched falling back]  
Christ, I could break my back.  [Visual images of lying at bottom of stairs 
with broken back] Gads, I'm all alone here.  [Visual images of dragging 
myself to phone and calling 911, then of ambulances pulling in and EMTs 
spilling into the front door]  
 
Ursula 2 :  With body held vertical, rotate 180 degrees in a perfect mid-air 
pivot so facing forward.  Plant left foot firmly in middle of first step when 
land on it.  Keeping that footing, lean body to right, where there's a wall, 
and slam shoulder into wall.  Put right foot down. Motion ceases.  
 
 So what do we have here?  Ursula 2 is clearly a machine, and a 
good thing too, since if my fate had been in the hands of Ursula1 the 
outcome would undoubtedly have been a disaster.  Reliably, and 
without rehearsal, she did what needed to be done:  Assess the 
situation, figure out the solution, and initiate the requisite sequential 
neuromuscular pathways.  Impressive as hell.  And of course, 
squirrels do such things routinely.  They’re also impressive as hell. 
Admire as we may the design features and adaptivity of what’s under 
the hoods of our cars, the internal combustion engine with all its 
ancillary gadgets doesn’t hold a candle to the simplest of brains, let 
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alone a squirrel’s, where memory and perception are integrated to 
initiate and carry out behavior appropriate to the circumstance.  
 
 But what about Ursula 1?  Although I could not formally prove 
this claim to a skeptic, it is my deep conviction that Ursula 1, my 
narrative self, also has a fully neural substrate, a machine that 
accesses and integrates perceptual and memory and emotional 
systems and generates emergent analyses of cause (must have 
stepped off landing), self-evaluation (idiot!), and scenarios of possible 
future outcomes (broken back) and possible responses to those 
outcomes (calling 911).  The brain-based sources of Ursula 1 might 
be called Ursula 0. 
 
 And here we arrive at the crucial existential interface:  Given 
that Ursula1 is emergent from Ursula 0, what is the nature of their 
relationship to one another?  At one extreme, is it the case that our 
narrative selves are in some sense just watching a movie of what 
Ursula 0 generates (whatever that means)?  Or are we directors of 
the movie, telling Ursula 0 what to come up with next for us to watch 
(whatever that means)?  When we engage in making a choice, is it 
just Ursula 0 doing this and then telling Ursula 1 about it, or do our 
narrative selves have input into the process, or do they somehow 
control the process? 
 
 It is my understanding that brain neuroscientists, while deeply 
interested in these questions, are still far from having answers, their 
current focus being on trying to figure out what Ursula 0 and Ursula 1 
are all about (they’ve made huge progress on Ursula 2) so that they 
can better understand how they interrelate.  But the prevailing hunch 
is that it’s going to be a complex kind of synergy, where sometimes 
we’re just watching and sometimes exercising levels of director-like 
causality.  Even when these relationships are understood more 
deeply, however, even when we have some notion of what we’re 
talking about when we say things like “watching” and “exercising 
causality,” it won’t affect our sense that our narrative selves are 
making the choices that they make, because that’s the way the 
experience of choosing comes to us.  Any other players in the 
dynamic are as inaccessible to our narrative selves as is Ursula 2’s 
process in executing the pivot.  
 
 15 
 In a claim that I could again not formally prove, it is my 
conviction that squirrels have Squirrel 0 (and Squirrel 2) but not 
Squirrel 1.  That is, they access and integrate memory and emotional 
systems and generate analyses of cause and scenarios of future 
outcomes and responses, but these processes are not, as near as I 
can tell, experienced by narrative squirrel selves.  In saying this I am 
in no way demeaning the minds of squirrels.  I am only saying that 
evolution wound up endowing humans with an additional kind of 
experience, the narrative experience of experience, which is 
apparently rooted in our unique capacity for language. 
 
  The most interesting thing about narrative selves is that they 
are not experienced as being brain-based even though they are.  
They are experienced as disembodied, immaterial, virtual; we carry a 
sense that there’s an “I” in there that’s somehow watching and 
directing the movie of our lives and falling asleep at night and waking 
up in the morning and, yes, dying at the end of a lifetime.  The fact 
that the emergent property of narrative self-awareness turns out to 
manifest itself in this peculiar virtual modality just is the qualia of the 
emergent reality of narrative self-awareness.   
 
So I can now circle back to my earlier assertions and say that 
Ursula 1, my virtual self, feels like she’s making free choices all the 
time, even as it is the case that the brain activity that undergirds this 
sense is chugging away in fully mechanical modes of operation.  I 
would say that this experience, and all the experiences we have in 
this virtual modality, are both real and astonishingly rich, potent, and 
fruitful.  Indeed, it could be said that our collective self-experience as 
choice-makers has much to do with much of the good, and much of 
the evil as well, that has transpired in our brief history as a species.  
To return to our philosopher, the causal efficacy of our sense of free 
will is in this sense indisputable.  
 
If religious relevance is to be found in biological evolution -- and 
I myself find it all over the place – then surely it is here.  Billions of 
years of mutation and selection produced reliable, mechanistic 
molecular pathways that undergird perception and response in all 
creatures.  Hundreds of millions of years of mutation and selection in 
animals allowed the cooption of these pathways into nervous systems 
and brains. Within the last million years, self-aware hominids, and 
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then humans, popped through with “minds of their own,” minds that 
not only think but experience thinking, minds that not only love but 
experience loving, minds that not only choose but tell themselves, 
and one another, about the choices they’ve made and plan to make.  
A core religious response is a sense of profound gratitude for the 
lives that we are given, and I offer such gratitude to the countless 
chances and selections that have brought all these wondrous 
outcomes into being.   
 
The Dalai Lama can take us out.  Maybe it’s not so important, 
he said, whether consciousness is an emergent property of biological 
evolution or whether it’s something that comes from without.  Maybe 
what’s more important is what we do with it.  
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